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C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 04871

LIMDIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR  
TAGS: INT, NJ, ES  
SUBJECT: NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE;  
SOUTHERN FRONT PROBLEMS WITH PASTORA

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY.

TWO LOCAL ARDE REPS EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULT SITUATION OF ARDE TROOPS IN SOUTHERN NICARAGUA AND SUGGESTED A BALANCED DISBURSEMENT OF ANY FUTURE AID. THEY SUGGESTED RENEGOTIATING A POLITICAL PROGRAM SIGNED BY PASTORA. THIS WOULD BE DONE IN ORDER TO HAVE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP EXCLUSIVELY OF BOS AND UNO SIGN AND OBTAIN THE NEED FOR ENRIQUE BERMUNDEZ TO SIGN. PASTORA'S VOLATILE PERSONALITY IS CAUSING DIVISIONS IN THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL FORCES OF ARDE. FINALLY, THE ARDE REPS ASKED FOR USG SUPPORT IN OPENING AN INFORMATION OFFICE IN SAN SALVADOR. END SUMMARY.

3. PLEA FOR MORE U.S. AID.

EMBOFF MET WITH  
MEMBERS OF THE FRENTE CONTINENTAL DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO (FSDC)

EXPLAINED THAT THE MILITARY ARM OF ARDE HAS NOT RECEIVED HELP IN TWO YEARS AND CLAIMED TO HAVE 2,000 GUNS AND MEN NOW INACTIVE BECAUSE OF LACK OF MUNITIONS AND OTHER LOGISTICS. THEY EXPECTED CONGRESS TO APPROVE ASSISTANCE TO THE NICARAGUAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS AND MADE A PLEA FOR MORE EQUILIBRIUM IN THE DISBURSEMENT OF THE AID BETWEEN UNO AND BOS. THEY FAVOR COORDINATED POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTION BETWEEN THE ARDE AFFILIATED BLOQUE OPOSITOR DEL SUR (BOS) AND UNO.

4. AGREEMENT ON COMMON POLITICAL PROGRAM.

RECENTLY SIGNED A POLITICAL PROGRAM ON BEHALF OF ARDE THAT WOULD SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR COOPERATION OF THE UNIFIED OPPOSITION BUT UNO HAS NOT SIGNED APPARENTLY BECAUSE ENRIQUE MILITARY CHIEF OF STAFF) IS PRESSURING TO SIGN FOR UNO. LIEVES A SOLUTION WOULD BE TO RENEGOTIATE

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THE DOCUMENT BRIEFLY AND HAVE ONLY THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS OF UNC AND BOS SIGN THE DOCUMENT.

5. PASTORA CAUSES INTERNAL DISPUTES IN ARDE.

EXPLAINED THAT SERIOUS INTERNAL PROBLEMS HAVE DEVELOPED WITHIN ARDE DUE TO THE STUBBORNNESS OF EDEN PASTORA. ON ONE SIDE BACKING PASTORA

ROBELO, AND COMMANDANTE EMILIANO (MILITARY CHIEF ALONG THE SAN JUAN RIVER). ON THE OTHER SIDE FAVORING A COLLEGIAL MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND STRICTLY POLITICAL ROLE FOR PASTORA WITHIN ARDE ARE: FSOC -- JOSE

RAYARDO LOPEZ, AND ARDE-ADOLFO (HAMORRO) PLUS THE ARDE FIELD COMMANDERS NOW INSIDE SOUTHEAST NICARAGUA GANZO, LEONEL, FRANKLIN, AND NAVAGANTE. THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF ARDE AND BOS IS UNHAPPY WITH THE UNCOORDINATED AND OFTEN UNHELPFUL WAY IN WHICH PASTORA SPEAKS OUT. THE MILITARY FIELD COMMANDERS DISLIKE THIS PLUS PASTORA'S ADMINISTRATION OF WHAT LITTLE FUNDS THEY RECEIVE FROM FOREIGN PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS AND PASTORA'S AUTOCRATIC STYLE IN RUNNING THE MILITARY OPERATIONS. THE MILITARY COMMANDERS, ACCORDING TO FAVOR A COLLEGIAL COORDINATING MECHANISM FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS AND HAVE STRONG SYMPATHY FOR THE POLITICAL POSITION OF THE FSOC.

6. BOS RUN INFORMATION OFFICE IN SAN SALVADOR.

SAID BOS WANTS TO OPEN AN INFORMATION OFFICE IN SAN SALVADOR AND SEEKS USG SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORT. THEY WANT TO EDUCATE SALVADORANS TO RESIST THE MARXIST ADVANCE IN EL SALVADOR AS WELL AS TO THE REALITY OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN NICARAGUA. THE OFFICE WOULD BE A SOURCE OF INFORMATION TO THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS. IT WOULD PROVIDE NAMES OF PRISONERS, DESCRIPTIONS OF ATROCITIES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND DISSEMINATE POLITICAL INFORMATION. (CLAIM THAT COSTA RICA IS SATURATED AND AN OFFICE NEEDS TO BE OPENED IN SAN SALVADOR.

7. COMMENT.

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LIMDIS

WE PRESUME ALL OR MOST OF THIS INFORMATION HAS ALREADY BEEN REPORTED THROUGH COSTA RICAN SOURCES BUT REPEAT IT FOR THOSE READERS WHO MAY BE UNINFORMED. COPIES OF COMMUNIQUEES AND LETTERS THAT DOCUMENT THE ABOVE INTERNAL DISPUTE IN ARDE ARE BEING POACHED TO ARA/CEN GAVE DLOUHY. APPARENTLY, THE FSOC AND OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS IN ARDE AND BOS AND THE FIELD COMMANDERS THEMSELVES ARE FINDING PASTORA NO EASIER TO DEAL WITH THAN DID ALFONSO ROBELO. HOWEVER, AT LEAST UNTIL CONGRESS DECIDES ON AID TO THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES FIGHTING THE SANDINISTAS, THERE WILL BE AN OPEN SPLIT WITHIN ARDE-BOS. ACCORDING TO A RESTRUCTURING OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF ARDE MAY WELL SERVE U.S. INTERESTS BY MAKING IT A MORE EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY AND BY REIGNING IN PASTORA FOR TIGHTER POLITICAL COORDINATION OF HIS ACTIVITIES AND COMMENTS.

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END OF MESSAGE

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EXDIS

EO 12356: DECL OADR

TAGS: PGOW PREL NU US

SUBJECT: OFFICIAL/US-NICARAGUAN RELATIONS

1. CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY:

SAID JUNE 4 THAT FSLN OFFICIALS HERE HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORT "TO MOLD OPINION" IN CONGRESS AGAINST THE GON HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL. HE EXPECTED A VOTE ON THE HILL IN COMING DAYS IN FAVOR OF AID OF SOME SORT FOR CONTRA FORCES. HE WAS DOWNBEAT AS WELL ON CONTADORA AND ON PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS. HE SAID HE SAW LITTLE PROFIT IN BEING FLEXIBLE TOWARD THE ADMINISTRATION BECAUSE IT NEVER RECIPROCATED. U.S. POLICIES WERE MAKING SOME IN THE FSLN "MORE STUBBORN", AND OTHERS WITH ITCHY TRIGGER FINGERS... WANTED TO GET IT OVER WITH (THE U.S.) NOW-- THOUGH HE QUICKLY QUALIFIED THE LATTER AS IRRESPONSIBLE. HE SAID NEGOTIATIONS COULD PRODUCE SOLUTIONS TO SUCH ISSUES AS SANDINISTA ASSISTANCE TO INSURGENT GROUPS. THIS COULD NOT HAPPEN. HOWEVER, WHILE THE FSLN WAS UNDER PRESSURE, IMPLIED ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT FSLN HAD COMMITTED ERRORS IN THE PAST, BUT QUESTIONED WHETHER GON EFFORTS TO CORRECT THOSE ERRORS WOULD PRODUCE PROGRESS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.

3.

POLCOUNS INVITATION FOR LUNCH AT LATTER'S RESIDENCE. WAS CLEARLY DEPRESSED, PERHAPS PARTICULARLY BECAUSE HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM ONE WEEK OF VIGOROUS MILITARY TRAINING AND WAS STIFF AND SORE. HE INITIATED THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE THOUGHT CONTADORA WAS GOING NO PLACE. HE REPEATED A VIEWPOINT HE HAD EXPRESSED ON EARLIER OCCASIONS--THAT NOTHING WILL MOVE IN CONTADORA UNTIL THE U.S. IS READY FOR IT. THE FSLN, HE CONTINUED, SAW NO PROFIT IN BEING FLEXIBLE TOWARD THE ADMINISTRATION. NO MATTER WHAT THE FSLN DID, THERE WAS NO REPLY. THAT DID NOT NEAN, HOWEVER, THAT THE GON WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE ACTIONS INTERNALLY OR EXTERNALLY TO DEMONSTRATE ITS SELF CONFIDENCE AND FLEXIBILITY. POLCOUNS ASKED WHAT HE HAD IN MIND. HE ANSWERED, "FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT WE ARE DOING WITH THE MISQUITOS". HE SAID THE FSLN WAS MAKING

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A REAL EFFORT TO CORRECT EARLIER ERRORS WITH THAT PEOPLE. POLCOUNS ASKED IF HE THOUGHT RIVERA WOULD RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. [ ] SAID HE THOUGHT HE WOULD. POLCOUNS ASKED WHY BORGE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ATLANTIC COAST AFFAIRS. [ ] SAID HE HAD HEARD BORGE HAD A PERSONAL INTEREST IN WHAT WAS HAPPENING THERE. IT MAY HAVE BEEN ALSO A DECISION BY THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE THAT HE WAS BEST QUALIFIED FOR THE JOB. WAS IT A DOWNGRADE FOR BORGE? NO. NOT A DOWNGRADE EITHER FOR HIM OR FOR COMANDANTE LUIS CARRION.

4. POLCOUNS ASKED HIS VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN CONGRESS AS IT PREPARED FOR ANOTHER VOTE ON CONTRA AID. [ ] SAID IT WAS "A REAL MESS". THERE WERE SO MANY PROPOSALS THAT NO ONE KNEW EXACTLY WHAT WAS HAPPENING. HE SAID HE AGREED WITH U.S. OBSERVERS THAT "HUMANITARIAN" AID TO THE CONTRAS OF SOME SORT WOULD BE PASSED. HE SAID PEOPLE IN MANAGUA WHO HAD READ THROUGH THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ON THE APRIL CONTRA AID VOTE CONCLUDED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORT TO MOLD OPINION IN CONGRESS AGAINST THE FSLN HAD BEEN LARGELY SUCCESSFUL. FEW MEMBERS OF CONGRESS NOW SUPPORTED THE GON. THOUGH MANY WERE STILL AGAINST MILITARY AID.

5. [ ] INSISTED, DURING A LENGTHY DISCUSSION ON LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH NICARAGUA, THAT THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION WAS CONSIDERED OF TRANSCENDENT IMPORTANCE BY MANY OF THE PEOPLE OF LATIN AMERICA. EVEN IF THE GOVERNMENTS DID NOT OPENLY SUPPORT THE GON, ATTEMPTS BY THESE GOVERNMENTS TO OPPOSE THE GON-- THROUGH, FOR EXAMPLE, APPROVING U.S. INTERVENTIONISM-- WOULD MEET WITH A STORM OF PUBLIC PROTEST. [ ] SAID HIS JUDGEMENT ON THIS ISSUE STEMMED FROM THE CROWDS WHICH GATHERED TO GREET AND WELCOME DANIEL ORTEGA THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA AND IN SPAIN. HE TOLD OF ONE INCIDENT IN THE LATTER COUNTRY IN WHICH THE CROWD REPORTEDLY BECAME SO OPENLY PRO-DANIEL AND ANTI-REAGAN THAT DANIEL HAD TO QUIET THE CROWD TO PREVENT EMBARRASSMENT TO FELIPE GONZALEZ, WHO STOOD NEXT TO HIM.

EXDIS

[ ] SAID ADMINISTRATION POLICIES TOWARD NICARAGUA MADE SOME IN THE FSLN "MORE STUBBORN". IT MADE THEM BELIEVE IN A STEREOTYPE OF THE U.S. "POLICY I KNOW IS NOT TRUE". [ ] REAGAN'S ACTIONS CONFIRM THE MOST SIMPLISTIC VIEW OF THE U.S. AND THE ROLE IT PLAYED IN THE HISTORY OF NICARAGUA.

[ ] CONTINUED THAT THE FSLN COULD NOT CHANGE WHILE IT WAS UNDER PRESSURE. IT COULD TAKE STEPS TO REMOVE OR REDUCE U.S. OBJECTIONS, BUT NOT UNDER PRESSURE. WHAT COULD THE TWO SIDES DO TO RESOLVE THIS DILEMMA? POLCOUNS REPLIED THAT IT WAS PERHAPS HARDEST TO AGREE ON WHAT SOLUTION SHOULD BE SOUGHT. THE SOLUTION THE U.S. NEEDED HAD ALREADY BEEN DEFINED IN ITS WELL-KNOWN FOUR POINTS. COULD THE FSLN ACCEPT, INTER ALIA, CESSATION OF AID TO INSURGENT FORCES IN OTHER STATES? [ ] REPLIED THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON THAT ISSUE. "NEGOTIATIONS COULD PRODUCE A SOLUTION". POLCOUNS NOTED THE DIFFICULTIES SURROUNDING THAT MATTER AND THE MOUNTING DISTRUST IT HAD CAUSED OVER THE YEARS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS. POLCOUNS HIMSELF HAD BEEN PRESENT SEVERAL TIMES WHEN HIGHEST LEVEL GON OFFICIALS FLATLY DENIED TO CODELS ANY GON INVOLVEMENT IN ASSISTANCE TO OTHER INSURGENT FORCES. WHEN WASHINGTON SAW REPORTS OF SUCH DENIALS AND HAD AT ITS HAND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THEY WERE NOT TRUE, U.S. WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE ON THE MATTER WAS REDUCED CONSIDERABLY. [ ] RESPONDED BY ASKING WHAT

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GOOD IT DID FOR THE FSLN TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE HAD BEEN A PERIOD DURING WHICH ITS LEADERSHIP HAD LOWERED THE LEVEL OF RHETORIC AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION. REAGAN, IN RETURN, HAD COMPARED THE FSLN "TO A PIECE OF MAGGOT INFESTED MEAT" IN A SPEECH. FSLN RHETORICAL EXCESSES HAD NEVER REACHED THE LEVEL OF REAGAN'S "WHAT IF WE TOOK STEPS TO SAY CERTAIN THINGS WERE DONE WRONGLY, THAT WE COMMITTED MISTAKES. WHAT GOOD WOULD IT DO IF WE REMOVED CERTAIN PEOPLE?". MENESES SAID THAT REAGAN WAS BENT ON REMOVING THE FSLN FROM POWER, ON DESTROYING IT. THERE WERE SOME IN THE FSLN "WHOSE TRIGGER FINGER WAS ITCHY," AND WHO THOUGHT "THE FSLN SHOULD GET IT OVER WITH NOW," NOT WAIT A FEW YEARS FOR THE INEVITABLE U.S. INTERVENTION. QUICKLY ADDED THAT SUCH A POINT OF VIEW WAS IRRESPONSIBLE. IT NEVERTHELESS SHOWED THAT THE FSLN WAS DETERMINED TO DEFEND THE REVOLUTION AND "WOULD NOT FLY OFF LIKE SOMOZA". IF THE U.S. INTERVENED, THE FSLN WOULD STAY AND FIGHT.

7. CONTINUED THAT EVEN IF THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUED TO PRESSURE NICARAGUA, SHORT OF INTERVENTION, THE FSLN WOULD SURVIVE. IT DID NOT REQUIRE MUCH SIMPLY TO SURVIVE. NO THOUGHT WAS NOW BEING GIVEN TO DEVELOPMENT OR OF SOLVING SOCIAL PROBLEMS; SURVIVAL WAS ON THE GOAL--"MAY BE WE WILL END UP LIKE SOME OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES, WORSE OFF THAN WE ARE NOW." IF IT MEANT WE WOULD DO WITHOUT CARS AND TRUCKS, THAT IS OKAY. THE "SOCIALIST\*COMMUNIST AND OTHER STATES WOULD GIVE NICARAGUA ENOUGH TO SURVIVE." IN FURTHER COMMENTS, SEEMED TO SUGGEST THAT THE FSLN CONSIDERED THAT ONCE THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAD SERVED ITS SECOND TERM, ITS PROBLEMS WOULD BE MUCH REDUCED. POLCOUNS ATTEMPTED TO DISABUSE HIM OF THIS NOTION, POINTING OUT THAT U.S./ NICARAGUAN RELATIONSHIPS HAD WORSENERD SHARPLY WHILE THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WAS STILL IN OFFICE. THE POST-REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WOULD PROBABLY HAVE MOST OF THE SAME PROBLEMS WITH NICARAGUA AS HAD HAD ITS TWO PREDECESSORS.

ASKED WHAT THE U.S. WOULD DO WERE THE CONTRAS DEFEATED BY THE SANDINISTA MILITARY FORCES--WOULD THE U.S. INTERVENE? POLCOUNS REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT GIVE A DEFINITIVE REPLY, BUT THAT SUCH AN OPTION WAS, OF COURSE, ALWAYS PRESENT. POLCOUNS ASKED IN TURN WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF CONTRA FORCES CONTINUED AT THE PRESENT LEVEL. SAID THE GON WOULD HVE NO CHOICE BUT TO EXPAND MOBILIZATION UNTIL IT COULD DESTROY THEM. POLCOUNS ASKED IF THIS WOULD MEAN AN INCREASED DRAFT. REPLIED THAT IT MIGHT NOT. OTHER FORCES SUCH AS INACTIVE RESERVE AND INACTIVE MILITIA COULD BE PUT ON COMBAT STATUS. DESTRUCTION OF THE CONTRA WAS IMPERATIVE, AND THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS WERE NECESSARY.

END OF MESSAGE

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